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RETURN FIRE: AN EN BANC HEARING IN 
WOLLSCHLAEGER v. GOVERNOR OF FLORIDA 
IS NECESSARY TO PROTECT THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT RIGHTS OF PHYSICIANS 
Abstract: In 2014, in Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Florida, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that a Florida ban on physician speech 
about firearm ownership was a valid regulation of professional conduct. The 
court reasoned that because the speech took place within the physician-patient re-
lationship it should be treated as professional conduct that may be regulated by 
the state and not subject to First Amendment scrutiny. This Comment argues that 
the Eleventh Circuit mischaracterized the speech as conduct and that an en banc 
hearing should be granted to reverse this decision to avoid a negative impact on 
physicians’ First Amendment rights. 
INTRODUCTION 
Florida Governor Rick Scott signed the Firearm Owners’ Privacy Act 
(“the Act”) into law on June 2, 2011.1 The Act restricts licensed health care 
practitioners’ ability to record information about patients’ firearm ownership, 
ask patients about firearm ownership, discriminate against a patient on the ba-
sis of firearm ownership, or harass a patient about firearm ownership.2 The 
Florida legislature passed the Act in reaction to complaints of discrimination 
against patients who refused to answer questions about gun ownership.3 Sup-
porters of the Act believe it protects the privacy of patients who exercise their 
right to bear arms, whereas opponents argue that the Act harms patient privacy 
                                                                                                                           
 1 Wollschlaeger v. Farmer (Wollschlaeger I), 814 F. Supp. 2d 1367, 1371 (S.D. Fla. 2011). The 
Act created Florida statute section 790.338, entitled “Medical privacy concerning firearms; prohibi-
tions; penalties; exceptions” and codified at FLA. STAT. §§ 790.338, 381.026. See FLA. STAT. 
§ 790.338 (2012); FLA. STAT. § 381.026 (2012); Wollschlaeger I, 814 F. Supp. 2d at 1371. The Act 
also amended section 456.072, entitled “Grounds for discipline; penalties; enforcement.” See FLA. 
STAT. § 456.072 (2012); Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla. (Wollschlaeger III), 760 F.3d 1195, 1204 
(11th Cir. 2014). 
 2 FLA. STAT. § 790.338; see Wollschlaeger I, 814 F. Supp. 2d at 1371. 
 3 Wollschlaeger v. Farmer (Wollschlaeger II), 880 F. Supp. 2d 1251, 1256 (S.D. Fla. 2012); see 
Fla. Health & Human Servs. Comm., H.R. Staff Analysis, H.R. 0155C, at 2 (Apr. 7, 2011) (ECF No. 
20–3) (describing an incident in Ocala, FL where a pediatrician asked a patient’s mother about fire-
arms in the home, the mother refused to respond due to privacy concerns, and the pediatrician then 
advised her that she had 30 days to find a new pediatrician for her child); Fla. Judiciary Comm., H.R. 
Staff Analysis, H.R. 0155E, at 2 (Apr. 12, 2011) (ECF No. 20–4) (“Florida law does not contain any 
provision that prohibits physicians or other medical staff from asking a patient whether he or she owns 
a firearm or whether there is a firearm in the patient’s home.”). 
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by impacting the patient-physician relationship.4 Supporters of the Act believe 
that gun ownership is not a public health issue, whereas opponents believe it 
is.5 
In 2011, in Wollschlaeger v. Farmer (Wollschlaeger I), Healthcare practi-
tioners brought suit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Flor-
ida, challenging the constitutionality of the Act in 2011 on First Amendment 
grounds.6 Although states have authority to regulate the professions, when 
those regulations impact the content of a professional’s speech the First 
Amendment may be implicated.7 In 2014, in Wollschlaeger v. Governor of 
Florida (Wollschlaeger III), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit 
ruled 2–1 that Florida’s ban on physician speech was a valid regulation of pro-
fessional conduct that did not have more than an incidental effect on physi-
cians’ speech.8 This meant that the Act did not violate the First Amendment 
rights of physicians.9 
This Comment argues that the Eleventh Circuit mischaracterized the 
speech in Wollschlaeger III as well as the impact its decision has on First 
Amendment rights of professionals.10 This Comment further argues that an en 
banc hearing should be granted to reverse this decision.11 Part I of this Com-
ment provides background on First Amendment jurisprudence as well the pro-
cedural history of Wollschlaeger III.12 Part II contrasts and compares the ma-
jority’s and dissent’s use of supporting cases.13 Finally, Part III argues that the 
                                                                                                                           
 4 Gayland O. Hethcoat II, In the Crosshairs: Legislative Restrictions on Patient-Physician Speech 
About Firearms, 14 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 1, 8–9 (2011) (“[S]upporters argue that firearm 
ownership is a fundamental right . . . and generally a private matter . . . . [O]pponents of the statute 
disagree . . . . Rather than safeguard patient’s privacy interests, they contend, the statute violates them 
by cutting into the patient-physician relationship.”). 
 5 Id. (noting that supporters and opponents cannot agree whether firearm ownership is a public 
health issue). 
 6 814 F. Supp. 2d at 1373; Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 2–4, Wollschlaeger 
II, 880 F. Supp. 2d 1251 (No. 11CV22026) (challenging the “Physician Gag Law” to protect the First 
Amendment rights of Florida healthcare practitioners). 
 7 See Wollschlaeger II, 880 F. Supp. 2d at 1262 (explaining that permissible state regulations 
govern the access or practice of a profession and do not burden or prohibit truthful, non-misleading 
speech that occurs within the scope of the profession and receives First Amendment protection); Nat’l 
Ass’n for the Advancement of Psychoanalysis v. Cal. Bd. of Psychology, 228 F.3d 1043, 1054 (9th 
Cir. 2000) (holding in part that a state’s police power allows it to regulate and license professions 
within the state “especially when public health concerns are affected”). 
 8 760 F.3d at 1203, 1230 (vacating the injunction against enforcement of the Act because there 
was no violation of physician’s First Amendment rights). 
 9 Id. at 1217 (holding that the Act did not facially violate the First Amendment because it was a 
regulation of professional conduct with no more than an incidental effect on physician’s speech). 
 10 See infra notes 80–97 and accompanying text. 
 11 See infra notes 80–97 and accompanying text. 
 12 See infra notes 15–44 and accompanying text. 
 13 See infra notes 45–79 and accompanying text. 
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majority misapplies the label of “conduct” to the physician speech in question 
and that an en banc hearing should be granted to reverse this holding.14 
I. THE FIRST AMENDMENT, PHYSICIAN SPEECH, AND WOLLSCHLAEGER 
This Part provides background on First Amendment jurisprudence as re-
lated to physician speech as well the procedural history of the Eleventh Cir-
cuit’s decision in Wollschlaeger III.15 Section A describes the type of speech 
that is protected by the First Amendment and the distinction that the courts 
make between conduct and speech in First Amendment jurisprudence.16 Sec-
tion B lays out the procedural history of Wollschlaeger III.17 
A. First Amendment Jurisprudence and Professional Speech 
The First Amendment states that Congress “shall make no law . . . abridg-
ing the freedom of speech.”18 The most fundamental, and often most challeng-
ing, question to First Amendment analysis is whether “speech” is even pre-
sent.19 There are three main types of speech recognized by the Court: (1) 
speech that is part of the “public discourse”—also known as “political speech”; 
(2) commercial speech; and (3) unprotected speech.20 Each is subject to a dif-
ferent level of scrutiny.21 The determination of which category of speech is at 
                                                                                                                           
 14 See infra notes 80–97 and accompanying text. 
 15 See infra notes 18–44 and accompanying text. 
 16 See infra notes 18–34 and accompanying text. 
 17 See infra notes 35–44 and accompanying text. 
 18 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 19 See R. George Wright, What Counts As “Speech” in the First Place?: Determining the Scope 
of the Free Speech Clause, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 1217, 1218 (2010). At least one scholar argues that the 
search for a “set of words that are both a precise equivalent to the meaning of ‘speech’ in our sense, 
and also easy to apply judicially” is futile. See id. at 1223. When faced with cases that demonstrate the 
overlap between speech and conduct, some courts simply assume speech has occurred and avoid ad-
dressing the constitutional question altogether. See id. at 1227. 
 20 McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1462 (2014) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“Political speech 
is ‘the primary objective of First Amendment protection’ and ‘the lifeblood of a self-governing peo-
ple.’” (quoting FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 465–66 (2001) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting))); United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2544 (2012) (delineating unpro-
tected categories of speech as incitement, obscenity, defamation, speech integral to criminal conduct, 
“fighting words”, child pornography, fraud, true threats, and “speech presenting some grave and im-
minent threat the government has the power to prevent”); Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. 
Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980) (defining commercial speech as “expression related solely 
to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience”). 
 21 See Robert A. Sedler, The “Law of the First Amendment” Revisited, 58 WAYNE L. REV. 1003, 
1009–10 (2013); Martha Swartz, Physician-Patient Communication and the First Amendment After 
Sorrell, 17 MICH. ST. U.J. MED. & L. 101, 105 (2012). Political speech receives the highest amount of 
protection under the First Amendment: strict scrutiny. See Swartz, supra, at 101, 105. When applying 
strict scrutiny, courts will uphold a regulation only if it is “necessary to serve a compelling state inter-
est” and narrowly drawn to achieve that end. Jennifer L. Pomeranz, Compelled Speech under the 
Commercial Speech Doctrine: The Case of Menu Label Laws, 12 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 159, 
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issue—and therefore which standard of review to use—is likely to determine 
the outcome a case.22 
Although it is well established that states have authority to regulate the 
professions, it remains an open question as to which constitutional standard 
courts should apply when determining whether a regulation of professional 
speech is valid.23 Until recently, courts have treated professional speech as 
                                                                                                                           
169–70 (2009); see McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2530 (2014) (explaining that to satisfy 
strict scrutiny, a regulation “must be the least restrictive means of achieving a compelling state inter-
est”); Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2738 (2011) (explaining that to pass strict 
scrutiny, the regulation in question must be “justified by a compelling government interest” and “nar-
rowly drawn to serve that interest”). 
 Commercial speech is understood as speech that involves the exchange of goods or services for a 
profit and is either subject to “intermediate scrutiny” or rational basis review. See Victor Brudney, The 
First Amendment and Commercial Speech, 53 B.C. L. REV. 1153, 1154–61 (2012) (providing a defini-
tion of commercial speech that includes “narrow” commercial speech and “enriched” commercial 
speech); Sedler, supra, at 1052–53 (2013); Swartz, supra, at 105–06. To survive intermediate scrutiny 
a state must show that the regulation “directly advances” a “substantial” government interest and that 
the regulation is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 
2653, 2674 (2011); Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. To survive rational basis review, the regulation 
must be “rationally related” to a “legitimate” government interest. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne 
Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985). 
 Unprotected speech is outside the bounds of the First Amendment and includes unlawful verbal 
acts, obscenity, child pornography, and government speech. Sedler, supra, at 1009–10. Criminal acts 
such as bribery or perjury are not protected by the First Amendment. Id. at 1010. This concept of 
unprotected speech, however, only applies to activity that is “otherwise unlawful and does not involve 
the expression of an idea or the discussion of matters of public interest.” Id. at 1012. The Court has 
held that the First Amendment does not allow the government to enact viewpoint-based regulations 
simply by calling them regulations of unprotected speech. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 
377, 384–90 (1992); see also Sedler, supra, at 1010 (proposing that the safe-harbor of unprotected 
“verbal acts” should not be available to the government for regulating harmful expression that is not 
otherwise unlawful); Eugene Volokh, Speech as Conduct: Generally Applicable Laws, Illegal Courses 
of Conduct, “Situation-Altering Utterances,” and the Uncharted Zones, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1277, 
1310–11 (2004–05) (arguing that courts should subject content-based speech restrictions to “serious 
First Amendment analysis” instead of “dodg[ing] this analysis by simply relabeling the speech as 
‘conduct’”). 
 22 See Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2552 (explaining that strict scrutiny implies “near-automatic con-
demnation” and rational basis review implies “near automatic approval” of the regulation at issue). 
But see Sedler, supra note 21, at 1030–31 (arguing that the standard of review has limited analytical 
significance in First Amendment law because the Court’s application of the relevant First Amendment 
principle, doctrine, or precedent, such as the content neutrality principle, to the facts of the instant case 
controls the outcome). 
 23 Wollschlaeger III, 760 F.3d at 1217; see Barsky v. Bd. of Regents, 347 U.S. 442, 449 (1954) 
(holding that it is elemental that a state has power to establish and enforce standards of conduct which 
extends to regulating the health professions); Nat’l Ass’n for the Advancement of Psychoanalysis, 228 
F.3d at 1054 (holding in part that a state’s police power allows it to regulate and license professions 
within the state “especially when public health concerns are affected”); Swartz, supra note 21, at 110; 
supra note 7 and accompanying text (describing that the First Amendment may be implicated by regu-
lations that impact the content of a professional’s speech). There is currently a circuit split regarding 
the appropriate standard of review for regulations of professional speech. See Michael Scott Leonard, 
‘Conversion Therapists’ Seek to Stay N.J. Ban Pending Supreme Court Appeal, WESTLAW J. HEALTH 
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commercial speech, applying either intermediate scrutiny or rational basis re-
view.24 Regulations on physicians’ speech, in turn, have been subjected to the 
same level of scrutiny as regulations on commercial speech.25 
When speech involves conduct or when speech is considered conduct in 
and of itself, it is difficult to know whether to apply First Amendment analysis 
and protections.26 Conduct generally receives no protection under the First 
Amendment’s right to free speech.27 Expressive conduct provides a major ex-
ception to this general rule; expressive conduct resembles speech and does re-
ceive some First Amendment protection.28 Conversely, some activity that liter-
ally involves speech, known as “speech as conduct,” loses its First Amendment 
protections because it is considered conduct.29 
The conduct-speech distinction is particularly influential when consider-
ing regulations of professional speech because it gives a framework for deter-
mining whether or not the activity should receive First Amendment protec-
                                                                                                                           
L., Oct. 1, 2014, available at 2014 WL 4851992 (explaining that some courts apply intermediate scru-
tiny when reviewing laws that limit professional speech while others apply rational basis review). 
 24 See King v. Governor of N.J., 767 F.3d 216, 234 (3d Cir. 2014) (reasoning that because “com-
mercial and professional speech share important qualities,” intermediate scrutiny is the appropriate 
standard to use when analyzing whether a regulation of professional speech infringes a professional’s 
First Amendment right to free speech); Swartz, supra note 21, at 105–06, 110 (“[C]ourts generally 
have treated professional communication during the provision of professional services as commercial 
speech, affording it less protection than that afforded to political speech.”). The King court found it 
persuasive that both commercial speech and professional speech were valuable because of their “in-
formational function” and both occurred in industries traditionally subject to government regulation. 
See 767 F.3d at 234. 
 25 See Swartz, supra note 21, at 113. 
 26 Volokh, supra note 21, at 1278–81 (describing situations in which the line between speech and 
conduct become blurred because of harm that stems from the speech); see also Edward J. Eberle, The 
Architecture of First Amendment Free Speech, 2011 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1191, 1216 (2011) (“The 
difficult questions of Free Speech involve behavior with elements of both communicative and non-
communicative qualities.”); Richard A. Seid, A Requiem for O’Brien: On the Nature of Symbolic 
Speech, 23 CUMB. L. REV. 563, 564 (1993) (explaining that the relationship between First Amend-
ment and conduct that occurs with speech is complex). The Court has never proposed a “fully satisfac-
tory” test for defining the boundary between speech and non-communicative conduct. Charles W. 
“Rocky” Rhodes, The First Amendment Structure for Speakers and Speech, 44 SETON HALL L. REV. 
395, 429 (2014). 
 27 See Kristie LaSalle, The Other 99% of the Expressive Conduct Doctrine: The Occupy Wall 
Street Movement and the Importance of Recognizing the Contribution of Conduct to Speech, 18 TEX. 
J. C.L. & C.R. 1, 13–14 (2012) (describing that the government’s police power traditionally allows it 
to regulate the conduct of citizens, except for actions such as “expressive conduct” which are deserv-
ing of First Amendment protections). 
 28 See id. But see United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) (“We cannot accept the 
view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled ‘speech’ whenever the person en-
gaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea.”). The Court has never proposed a “fully 
satisfactory” test for defining the boundary between speech and non-communicative conduct. Rhodes, 
supra note 26, at 429. 
 29 Volokh, supra note 21, at 1281. 
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tions.30 There are three categories of activity by professionals that fall along 
the speech-conduct continuum: (1) actual conduct; (2) professional speech; and 
(3) protected speech.31 Actual conduct, such as administering medicine to a 
patient, is outside the purview of the First Amendment and may be regulated 
by the government.32 Protected speech, such as a published article written by a 
doctor on a topic of health, may not be licensed or regulated by the govern-
ment.33 There is disagreement, however, about whether or not professional 
speech, such as a physician’s recommendation to a patient to make a lifestyle 
change such as eating less red meat, should be subject to government regula-
tion as conduct or protected under the First Amendment as speech.34 
B. From the Florida Legislature to the Courtroom 
Four days after Governor Scott signed the Act into law, healthcare practi-
tioners filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action seeking the Act’s repeal.35 In Woll-
schlaeger I, practitioners challenged the Act on the basis that it violated their 
First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.36 The State defended the Act as di-
                                                                                                                           
 30 See Robert Kry, The “Watchman for Truth”: Professional Licensing and the First Amendment, 
23 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 885, 896–97 (2000) (explaining how the conduct-speech distinction guides 
First Amendment analysis of professional speech). But see Volokh, supra note 21, at 1346 (arguing 
that the “conduct-speech” distinction is “more misleading than helpful” when determining the appro-
priate First Amendment standard of review for government regulation of professional speech). 
 31 Kry, supra note 30, at 896–97 (listing the three categories of professional activity and their 
treatment under the First Amendment). 
 32 Id. at 896 (noting that actual conduct does not receive First Amendment protections because it 
is nonexpressive). 
 33 Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1227 (9th Cir. 2013) (“[W]here a professional is engaged in a 
public dialogue, First Amendment protection is at its greatest.”); Kry, supra note 30, at 896–97. 
 34 See King, 767 F.3d at 224–25 (ruling that speech used as part of mental health treatment is 
speech, not conduct, and thus subject to a First Amendment analysis); Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1228–29, 
1232 (holding that the statute prohibiting licensed mental health providers from providing sexual 
orientation change efforts therapy to children did not violate provider’s First Amendment rights); Kry, 
supra note 30, at 896 (suggesting that professional speech that occurs in the course of professional 
conduct should be subject to state regulation); Volokh, supra note 21, at 1346 (arguing that the pur-
pose of professional speech regulations is to limit the speech and its message and not simply to regu-
late professional practice). 
 35 Wollschlaeger III, 760 F.3d at 1205; see Complaint, supra note 6, at 4, 23. Section 1983 pro-
vides a remedy for citizens who have had their rights violated by a federal, state, or local government 
official by allowing them to bring a civil action. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). The ensuing legal battle 
between the State of Florida and physicians practicing in Florida was quickly dubbed “Docs v. 
Glocks.” See Editorial, Doctor Gag Law Indefensible, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Sept. 16, 2011, at 
A14. 
 36 814 F. Supp. 2d at 1373; Complaint, supra note 6, at 23–24 (arguing that the Act infringed 
upon plaintiffs’ freedom to communicate with and counsel patients about topics such as limiting 
health risks associated with firearm ownership; failed to give plaintiffs adequate notice of the conduct 
prohibited by such Act; and curtailed plaintiffs’ freedom to receive information about firearms as part 
of their own preventative medical care). 
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rected at preventing harassment and discrimination.37 On June 2, 2012, the 
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida granted practitioners’ 
motion for summary judgment and permanently enjoined the State of Florida 
from enforcing the contested provisions of the Act.38 The court held that the 
provisions violated the First Amendment rights of the practitioners.39 The State 
appealed.40 
In 2014, in Wollschlaeger III, a panel from the Eleventh Circuit reversed 
the district court’s grant of summary judgment.41 The majority held that “[t]he 
Act is a valid regulation of professional conduct” that has “only incidental ef-
fect on physicians’ speech” and thus is not subject to First Amendment scruti-
ny.42 The dissent argued that the Act is a “gag order” that chills practitioners’ 
speech, infringes upon their First Amendment rights, and should be subject to 
at least intermediate scrutiny.43 On August 15, 2014, petitioners filed a petition 
for rehearing en banc, arguing that the majority erred in its holding that the 
speech at issue was professional conduct and thus not subject to protection un-
der the First Amendment.44 
                                                                                                                           
 37 Wollschlaeger I, 814 F. Supp. 2d at 1372. The State also argued that the Act violated residents’ 
Second Amendment rights. Id. The district court rejected the State’s contention that this case con-
cerned a Second Amendment issue because the statute in question did not prevent Florida residents 
from owning or using firearms. Id. at 1374. Although both supporters and opponents of the Act call 
attention to the Second Amendment, both scholars and the court understand that the Second Amend-
ment is “analytically irrelevant” to the discussion of the Act’s constitutionality. See id.; Hethcoat, 
supra note 4, at 10 (arguing that discussions of the Second Amendment have been “mostly symbolic” 
because Florida has not done anything to infringe Second Amendment rights); Paul Sherman & Rob-
ert McNamara, Op-Ed, Censorship in Your Doctor’s Office, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2014, at A17 (opin-
ing that the Wollschlaeger III ruling was, at most, a symbolic victory for gun rights), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/02/opinion/censorship-in-your-doctors-office.html, archived at http://
perma.cc/MLJ9-JMWH. 
 38 Wollschlaeger II, 880 F. Supp. 2d at 1270. This ruling followed one from September 14, 2011 
in which the district court granted practitioners’ motion for preliminary injunction. See Wollschlaeger 
I, 814 F. Supp. 2d at 1384. 
 39 Wollschlaeger II, 880 F. Supp. 2d at 1261 (holding the provisions imposed a content-based 
restriction of practitioners’ speech about firearms). The district court also held that the four challenged 
provisions of the Act were void for vagueness. Id. at 1268. At issue also was the question of whether 
or not the practitioners had standing to sue. Id. at 1257. The district court held that the practitioners 
had standing. Id. at 1259. 
 40 See Wollschlaeger III, 760 F.3d at 1203. The State challenged the following holdings: justicia-
bility of plaintiffs’ claims, determination of the challenged provisions to be content-based speech 
restriction and not regulation of professional conduct, and unconstitutional vagueness of the chal-
lenged provisions. See id. at 1207. 
 41 Id. at 1203, 1230. This decision also vacated the permanent injunction granted two years earli-
er. See id. 
 42 Id. at 1217; see LaSalle, supra note 27, at 13–14 (stating that under its police power, the gov-
ernment may regulate conduct). 
 43 Wollschlaeger III, 760 F.3d at 1230 (Wilson, J., dissenting). 
 44 Petition For Rehearing En Banc at 3–4, Wollschlaeger III, 760 F.3d 1195) (No. 12-14009) 
(asserting that “the holding [from Wollschlaeger III] that the state can regulate speech by recharacter-
izing it as ‘conduct’ is contrary to Supreme Court precedent”); Brief of the American Bar Association 
130 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 56:E. Supp. 
II. GETTING TO MAYBE: THE WOLLSCHLAEGER III MAJORITY AND 
DISSENT’S DIFFERING INTERPRETATIONS OF EXISTING PRECEDENT 
This part discusses the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit’s 
holding and the dissent’s reasoning in Wollschlaeger III.45 In particular, the 
section also discusses two cases: first, the 1985 U.S. Supreme Court decision 
in Lowe v. SEC and second, the 2013 U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit decision in Pickup v. Brown.46 Both of these cases are fundamental to the 
reasoning in the majority and dissenting opinions in Wollschlaeger III.47 Sec-
tion A discusses the majority’s holding and the dissent’s reasoning in Woll-
schlaeger III.48 Section B covers the Wollschlaeger III court’s application of 
precedent to the Firearm Owners’ Privacy Act.49 
A. Majority Holding and Dissent’s Reasoning 
The majority in Wollschlaeger III held that the Act is a “valid regulation 
of professional conduct” that protects patient privacy and limits abuse of the 
physician-patient relationship.50 Of particular importance to the majority in 
determining whether the physician behavior at issue is protected speech under 
the First Amendment was the concept of “personal nexus.”51 The majority held 
that when a physician speaks to a patient within the confines of a personal 
nexus, he or she can be said to be taking part in professional conduct that may 
be regulated by the state.52 The majority also held that the Act placed only an 
incidental burden on physician speech because the state is free to regulate 
                                                                                                                           
as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petition for Rehearing En Banc of Plaintiffs-Appelleess, Dr. Bernd 
Wollschlaeger, et. al. at 5, Wollschlaeger III, 760 F.3d 1195 (No. 12-14009) (urging the Eleventh 
Circuit to grant an en banc hearing to reverse the Wollschlaeger III decision that the ABA considers to 
not follow existing Supreme Court precedent). 
 45 See infra notes 50–79 and accompanying text. 
 46 See infra notes 50–79 and accompanying text. 
 47 See infra notes 50–79 and accompanying text. 
 48 See infra notes 50–59 and accompanying text. 
 49 See infra notes 60–79 and accompanying text. 
 50 760 F.3d 1195, 1203, 1217 (11th Cir. 2014) (allowing ban on physicians’ speech about fire-
arms during the course of professional conduct because such speech does not implicate the First 
Amendment). 
 51 See id. at 1218 (citing Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 232 (1985) (White, J., concurring)) (de-
scribing that a “personal nexus” between a physician and patient exists when a physician provides 
health care services in which he or she exercises judgment on behalf of a patient with whom he or she 
is familiar). 
 52 See id. at 1218–19 (explaining the Lowe reasoning that communications within a personal nex-
us constitute conduct that may be regulated by the state). This is in contrast to when a physician 
speaks publically, such as at a medical conference, and his or her speech is protected to the full extent 
possible under the First Amendment. See id. at 1218. 
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medical practice, which often necessarily involves physician speech.53 To the 
majority, the Act simply codifies that “the practice of good medicine does not 
require interrogation about irrelevant, private matters,” such as firearm owner-
ship.54 The majority conceptualizes the Act as just another regulation doctors 
must consider when providing patient care to avoid a malpractice suit or disci-
pline by the state.55 
The dissent viewed the physicians’ behavior at issue as speech and argued 
that the Act is a content-, speaker-, and viewpoint-based restriction of this 
speech that was passed to silence Florida doctors’ message about firearm safe-
ty.56 The dissent argued that this regulation does not survive intermediate scru-
tiny.57 The dissent also argued that the Act is not necessary to protect the rights 
Florida claims it was protecting in passing the law.58 The dissent characterized 
the majority opinion as modifying the level of scrutiny that historically has 
been applied to content-based restrictions on the basis that the speech occurs in 
private within a professional relationship.59 
B. Precedent as Applied by the Wollschlaeger III Court 
The majority in Wollschlaeger III interpreted precedent broadly to support 
labeling physicians’ speech as conduct that could be regulated by the state, 
whereas the dissent read both cases narrowly.60 Despite reaching different con-
                                                                                                                           
 53 See id. at 1203. The majority also notes that “for millennia” physicians have been subject to 
professional codes of conduct that define for the profession the standard of good practice of medicine. 
See id. 
 54 See id.  
 55 See id. at 1216–17. The majority notes that doctors are bound to provide patient care that is in 
accordance with the regulations within the state in which they practice. See id. The majority also em-
phasized that the Act does not alter doctors’ routine behavior of assessing whether or not a decision 
relevant to patient care constitutes malpractice. See id. at 1216. 
 56 See id. at 1230–31, 38 (Wilson, J., dissenting) (“[T]he perceived problem with doctors’ truth-
ful, non-misleading message regarding firearm safety was that it was working, so the message was 
silenced.”). The dissenting judge believes that physicians, despite the personal nexus with patients, 
have a First Amendment right to convey messages to their patients, about firearms or other topics. See 
id. at 1230. 
 57 See id. at 1239 (suggesting that in lieu of a choice between conduct and speech, the appropriate 
choice for the court to make was between intermediate scrutiny and strict scrutiny, although the Act 
would fail under both standards). 
 58 See id. at 1230–31 (articulating State’s contention that the law was passed to protect privacy 
rights of firearm owners, the right of firearm owners to be free from discrimination and harassment, 
and the right of firearm owners to access medical care); see also supra note 3 and accompanying text 
(describing Florida’s legislature’s motivation for passing the statute). 
 59 See Wollschlaeger III, 760 F.3d at 1236–37; see also United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 
2543–44 (2012) (explaining that content-based restrictions on speech are presumed invalid); Holder v. 
Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 28 (2010) (stating that if a challenged regulation is related to 
expression, then a more demanding standard than that put forth in O’Brien is required). 
 60 Compare Wollschlaeger III, 760 F.3d at 1217–20 (majority opinion) (using Lowe theory of 
personal nexus to support holding that speech that occurs within personal nexus is conduct that may 
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clusions about the behavior at issue, and subsequently the validity of the Act, 
both the majority and the dissent used Justice Byron White’s concurring opin-
ion in Lowe as a starting point for their analyses.61 In his concurring opinion, 
Justice White discussed the continuum of speech and where along this contin-
uum speech may be regulated.62 The continuum ranges from speech that oc-
curs wholly within a profession and may be regulated by the state to that which 
occurs outside of the profession, in other words publicly, and is protected by 
the First Amendment.63 The distinguishing factor between the two kinds of 
speech for Justice White is the personal nexus between professional and client, 
within which speech by a professional can be construed as “incidental to the 
conduct of the profession.”64 
The majority in Wollschlaeger III accepted Justice White’s analysis, 
whereas the dissent interpreted the opinion more narrowly.65 The majority in 
Wollschlaeger III adopted Justice White’s analysis wholly and rested its analy-
sis on this concept of “personal nexus” as begetting conduct that may be regu-
lated by the state.66 The dissent in Wollschlaeger III, on the other hand, inter-
preted Lowe as demonstrating that a law that regulates professional conduct 
and also burdens speech may only escape traditional First Amendment scrutiny 
when certain factors are met.67 The dissent argued that the majority construed 
                                                                                                                           
be regulated freely by the state), and Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1228 (9th Cir. 2013) (ruling 
that challenged law was a regulation of professional conduct based on the idea of personal nexus from 
Lowe), with Wollschlaeger III, 760 F.3d at 1239 (Wilson, J., dissenting) (arguing that Lowe stands for 
the proposition that regulations of professional conduct that burden speech are free from First 
Amendment scrutiny only when certain factors are met). 
 61 See Wollschlaeger III, 760 F.3d at 1217–18 (majority opinion); id. at 1239–40, 1250 (Wilson, 
J., dissenting). In Lowe, the Supreme Court considered whether the petitioners, who were not regis-
tered as investment advisers, could be enjoined from publishing investment advice and commentary in 
securities newsletters. See 472 U.S. at 183.  
 62 See Lowe, 472 U.S. at 232 (White, J., concurring) (discussing the location of the tipping point 
between regulating a profession and limiting free speech of professionals). 
 63 See id. (suggesting that speech that occurs within a profession is part of the practice of that 
profession and as such may be regulated by the state when it issues licenses to people to practice that 
profession). 
 64 See id. (arguing that absence of a personal nexus between professional and client demonstrates 
that the professional is not currently engaging in professional speech, thus state regulation becomes a 
restriction on a citizen’s ability to speak, which implicates the First Amendment, instead of a re-
striction on how a state-licensed professional may conduct him or herself with a client). 
 65 See 760 F.3d at 1218 (majority opinion) (quoting at length from Justice White’s concurrence in 
Lowe); id. at 1240 (Wilson, J., dissenting) (“Lowe established only that the existence of a professional 
relationship is a necessary condition if a law burdening speech is to evade First Amendment scrutiny. 
Nothing in Lowe implied that such a condition was sufficient to support this conclusion.”). 
 66 See id. at 1218–19 (majority opinion) (stating that the Act regulates physician speech “within 
the confines of the physician’s examination room” where the personal nexus is strongest and that 
despite restrictions on physicians’ ability to ask about fire ownership, the Act merely “defin[es] the 
practice of good medicine, in the context of the very private, physician-patient relationship”). 
 67 See id. at 1239 (Wilson, J., dissenting). The four factors that must be present, according to the 
dissent, in order to escape First Amendment scrutiny are: (1) the law is a licensing scheme for a pro-
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Lowe too broadly and overemphasizes the personal nexus concept.68 The dis-
sent read Lowe to establish that the personal nexus between professional and 
client is necessary, but not, as the majority held, sufficient, to exempt the 
speech from First Amendment scrutiny.69 
Second, both the majority and dissent also used a discussion of profes-
sional speech found in Pickup, a 2013 decision by the Ninth Circuit, in which 
the court considered whether a legislature could avoid First Amendment scru-
tiny by classifying the speech in question as conduct.70 To the Wollschlaeger 
III majority, doctors’ speech about firearms is medical conduct and escapes 
First Amendment scrutiny just as the treatment in Pickup did.71 In particular, 
the majority uses Pickup as an example of another court applying Justice 
White’s reasoning from Lowe to uphold a regulation of professional conduct 
that is not a licensing scheme.72 The majority calls attention to the reasoning 
from Pickup that doctors are often held liable for giving negligent medical ad-
vice.73 As a state-regulated profession, doctors cannot argue that they have a 
First Amendment right to provide advice to patients that goes against the ac-
cepted standard of care.74 As such, the Wollschlaeger III court used Pickup to 
conclude that there is a significant amount of speech regulation that is allowed 
within a professional relationship that would never be allowed outside of it.75 
The dissent highlighted that the Ninth Circuit in Pickup distinguished 
several types of professional speech: a professional’s public speech, a profes-
sional’s speech within a professional relationship with a client, and a profes-
                                                                                                                           
fession; (2) the impact on speech, felt only by unlicensed practitioners, is incidental to the state’s goal 
of regulating the profession; (3) the law is content-neutral; and (4) the speech of unlicensed individu-
als is not proscribed outside the confines of a professional-client relationship. See id. 
 68 See id. at 1240 (noting the “faulty logic” behind the majority’s reasoning that if a person who 
operates outside of a professional relationship has First Amendment protection, then a person who 
operates within a professional relationship has no First Amendment protection). 
 69 See id. 
 70 See id. at 1223–25 (majority opinion); id. at 1246–48 (Wilson, J., dissenting); Pickup, 740 F.3d 
at 1227–29. The challenged statute regulated what a healthcare provider could say to a patient, specif-
ically prohibiting healthcare providers from engaging in therapy with a minor to attempt to alter the 
minor’s sexual orientation. Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1215. The court upheld the statute as a valid regulation 
of professional conduct stating that the statute bans a form of treatment, which is conduct, and not 
physicians’ ability to discuss, for example, the pros and cons of that treatment. See id. at 1229, 1231–
32. 
 71 Wollschlaeger III, 760 F.3d at 1217 (majority opinion). 
 72 See id. at 1225. 
 73 Id. at 1217. 
 74 See id.; Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1228. The majority continues: “when professionals, by means of 
their state-issued licenses, form relationships with clients, the purpose of those relationships is to 
advance the welfare of the clients, rather than to contribute to public debate.” See Wollschlaeger III, 
760 F.3d at 1223; Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1229–29. 
 75 See Wollschlaeger III, 760 F.3d at 1223. 
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sional’s conduct that is carried out through speech.76 The dissent disagreed 
with the majority’s binary representation of First Amendment protection for 
speech within and without professional relationships.77 To the Wollschlaeger 
III dissent, doctors’ speech about firearms is speech about a topic related to the 
practice of medicine, if not simply public speech, and should be subject to at 
least intermediate scrutiny.78 The dissent characterized the majority’s holding 
in Wollschlaeger III as “lump[ing] all speech . . . into one, unprotected catego-
ry” of speech that occurs within a professional relationship.79 
III. EN BANC HEARING NECESSARY TO PROTECT FIRST AMENDMENT  
RIGHTS OF PHYSICIANS 
 An en banc hearing should be granted by the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Eleventh Circuit to reverse its 2014 decision in Wollschlaeger III.80 The en 
banc hearing is needed because the court mischaracterized the behavior in 
question as conduct and because of the consequences of the Wollschlaeger III 
decision on the First Amendment rights of professionals.81 
The Wollschlaeger III court mischaracterized physician speech as con-
duct, which ignores precedent and creates a dangerous categorical exception to 
the First Amendment.82 The majority argued that a physician’s inquiry about 
                                                                                                                           
 76 See id. at 1240 (Wilson, J., dissenting); Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1227–29. In Pickup, the speech was 
the functional equivalent of therapy, and thus fell into the third category, which receives the least 
amount of First Amendment protection in that it is not subject to scrutiny because professional con-
duct may be regulated by the state. See Wollschlaeger III, 760 F.3d at 1247–48; Pickup, 740 F.3d at 
1230. 
 77 See Wollschlaeger III, 760 F.3d at 1240. 
 78 See id. at 1247–48, 1270. 
 79 See id. at 1247 (arguing that the majority disregarded the nuances between public speech, 
which is subject to First Amendment scrutiny; speech about medically-related topics, also known as 
professional speech; and speech that is the “functional equivalent of a medical procedure,” which may 
be regulated by the state as conduct). 
 80 See Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla. (Wollschlaeger III), 760 F.3d 1195, 1249 (11th Cir. 
2014) (Wilson, J., dissenting) (warning of the consequences of the Wollschlaeger III decision); Peti-
tion For Rehearing En Banc, supra note 44, at 12 (explaining that the Wollschlaeger III decision 
wrongly creates a categorical exception to the First Amendment); infra notes 82–92 and accompany-
ing text. 
 81 See 760 F.3d at 1237–38 (Wilson, J., dissenting); Petition For Rehearing En Banc, supra note 
44, at 3–5; infra notes 93–97 and accompanying text. 
 82 See 760 F.3d at 1203 (majority opinion); supra notes 18–22 and accompanying text. The ma-
jority labels physician speech, which includes written and verbal communication, as conduct and 
avoids a discussion of whether or not the Firearm Owners’ Privacy Act would pass constitutional 
muster as a regulation of speech. See Wollschlaeger III, 760 F.3d at 1203; see also Holder v. Humani-
tarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 27–28 (2010) (rejecting government’s argument that the Court should 
apply a more lenient standard of review to challenged law that prohibited legal counseling because it 
functioned as a regulation of conduct); King v. Governor of N.J., 767 F.3d 216, 225–26 (3d Cir. 2014) 
(reasoning that the Holder Court’s determination that legal counseling was speech was dispositive on 
issue of whether a physician’s counseling was speech or conduct). 
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firearms is “the opening salvo in an attempt to treat any issues raised by the 
presence of firearms” and refused to distinguish between such physician 
speech and the resulting physician conduct (treatment).83 Existing precedent 
suggests that the government may not escape First Amendment review of a 
regulation aimed at limited speech by arguing that the regulation applies to 
conduct only.84 Analysis such as this that reduces First Amendment analysis to 
a “semantic exercise” has been rejected by the Supreme Court.85 Most recently, 
in 2014, just months after the Wollschlaeger III decision, in King v. Governor 
of New Jersey, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit struck down 
such an argument when it held that a physician’s verbal communications do 
not become conduct when they are used as a vehicle for mental health treat-
ment.86 The court in King noted that defendants were unable to provide any 
binding precedent that characterized verbal communications as conduct based 
on its function.87 
The Eleventh Circuit’s acceptance of this semantic argument creates a 
dangerous categorical exception to First Amendment scrutiny.88 To justify it’s 
labeling of physician speech as conduct, the majority relies heavily on Justice 
White’s concurrence in the 1985 U.S. Supreme Court decision Lowe v. SEC.89 
The majority reads Lowe broadly as holding that where a “personal nexus” 
exists, the physician is participating in professional conduct that may be regu-
lated by the state.90 Labeling physician speech as conduct opens it up to state 
regulation, which in Wollschlaeger III amounted to removing First Amendment 
                                                                                                                           
 83 See Wollschlaeger III, 760 F.3d at 1224 (“Although the Ninth Circuit chose to draw a bright 
line between the recommendation at issue in Conant and the therapy at issue in Pickup, we do not find 
such a line here . . . .”). 
 84 Petition For Rehearing En Banc, supra note 44, at 4, 5–9 (reviewing existing precedent both 
from Supreme Court and the Eleventh Circuit). 
 85 Id. at 9 (“[T]he Supreme Court repeatedly has rejected an analysis that reduces the ‘First 
Amendment . . . to a simple semantic exercise . . . .’” (citing Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 
U.S. 533, 547 (2001)); see Holder, 561 U.S. at 26–28 (rejecting that the issue in the litigation was 
conduct, not speech, despite litigants portraying the statute in question as directed only at conduct). 
 86 King, 767 F.3d at 225 (“[W]e see no reason here to reach the counter-intuitive conclusion that 
the verbal communications that occur during . . . counseling are ‘conduct.’”). Compare Wollschlaeger 
III, 760 F.3d at 1224 (“When a physician enters a patient’s firearm ownership status into the patient’s 
medical records . . . this is part and parcel with the physician’s treatment of the patient.”), with King, 
767 F.3d at 229 (“Simply put, speech is speech, and it must be analyzed as such for the purposes of 
the First Amendment.”). 
 87 King, 767 F.3d at 225. 
 88 See Petition For Rehearing En Banc, supra note 44, at 12 (noting that the Wollschlaeger III 
decision creates a “broad new categorical exception to the First Amendment”); Brief of the American 
Bar Association as Amicus Curiae, supra note 44, at 5–6 (“The panel decision also upholds an im-
permissible restriction by carving out a new category of expression that is afforded no First Amend-
ment protection . . . .”). 
 89 See Wollschlaeger III, 760 F.3d at 1218; supra notes 50–52 and accompanying text (discussing 
the use of the Lowe decision by the Wollschlaeger III majority). 
 90 See Wollschlaeger III, 760 F.3d at 1218. 
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protections from all physician speech about firearms that was not relevant to a 
patient’s care.91 The Supreme Court generally rejects such attempts to add cat-
egorical exceptions to the First Amendment.92 
If the Wollschlaeger III decision stands and is not reviewed en banc, it 
will invite more regulation of physician and professional speech.93 The cate-
gorical exception created by Wollschlaeger III allows Florida to ban speech 
about any topic so long as it says it is irrelevant to the practice of medicine.94 
Under this reasoning, First Amendment scrutiny would not apply to a regula-
tion that prohibited physician speech within the context of the physician-
patient relationship on such topics as the Affordable Care Act, Medicare, Med-
icaid, or even abortion.95 The door that the Eleventh Circuit has opened in 
Wollschlaeger III, which allows Florida to pass these types of regulations, 
must be closed before the speech of all professionals is under attack.96 To 
                                                                                                                           
 91 See Petition For Rehearing En Banc, supra note 44, at 12–13 (“It is particularly dangerous that 
the majority exempts doctor-patient communications from First Amendment scrutiny . . . .”); Brief of 
the American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae, supra note 44, at 10 (“The panel decision upholds 
this speech restriction by carving out a new category of speech that is afforded no First Amendment 
protection, namely speech between regulated professionals and their patients or clients that does not 
meet a vague legislatively-set ‘relevance’ test.”). 
 92 See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2734 (2011) (explaining that the Court 
does not have “freewheeling authority to declare new categories of speech outside the scope of the 
First Amendment” (quoting United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 472 (2010))). But see Ronald K.L. 
Collins, Symposium, Exceptional Freedom—The Roberts Court, the First Amendment, and the New 
Absolutism, 76 ALB. L. REV. 409, 417–22 (2013) (listing forty-eight categories of unprotected expres-
sion). 
 93 See 760 F.3d at 1249 (Wilson, J., dissenting) (warning that after this decision, all private 
speech from professionals to patients is subject to regulation by the state and need not meet First 
Amendment scrutiny); First Amendment—Eleventh Circuit Upholds Florida Law Banning Doctors 
from Inquiring About Patients’ Gun Ownership When Such Inquiry is Irrelevant to Medical Care—
Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Florida, 760 F.3d 1195 (11th Cir. 2014), 128 HARV. L. REV. 1045, 
1045, 1049 [hereinafter Eleventh Circuit Upholds Florida Law] (arguing that if the Wollschlaeger III 
decision is followed it would fundamentally alter both American citizenship and the rights afforded to 
doctors as professionals). 
 94 See 760 F.3d at 1250 (“If States can declare, without scrutiny, that questioning about firearms 
is bad medicine, then States can declare, without scrutiny, that discussions about any topic are bad 
medicine that can be eliminated from the doctor-patient relationship.”); Eleventh Circuit Upholds 
Florida Law, supra note 93, at 1054 (“Wollschlaeger handed the state a ‘new and powerful tool to 
silence expression’—one far more powerful than that constructed in Pickup itself . . . .” (quoting 
Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1216 (9th Cir. 2013) (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting from denial of 
rehearing en banc))). 
 95 See Wollschlaeger III, 760 F.3d at 1238 (lamenting similar laws to the Act that could be passed 
to further restrict physician speech to patients); Petition for Rehearing En Banc, supra note 44 at 14 
(“The majority opinion opens the door for interest groups to push legislation to silence professional 
advice they find inconvenient.”). 
 96 See Wollschlaeger III, 760 F.3d at 1238, 1250 (expressing concern over the leeway the Woll-
schlaeger III decision gives state governments to proscribe speech of physicians on contentious top-
ics); Brief of the American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae, supra note 44, at 1–2 (“By extension, 
the precedential force of the panel decision could reach speech by other regulated professionals (such 
as attorneys), to limit counseling their clients unless the discussion meets a vague ‘relevance’ test set 
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avoid this situation, the Eleventh Circuit must grant an en banc hearing and 
reverse its decision in Wollschlaeger III.97 
CONCLUSION 
Doctors have a First Amendment right to communicate with their pa-
tients. Although a state may regulate the professions generally, those regula-
tions need to be subject to First Amendment scrutiny in order to protect the 
First Amendment rights of physicians and other professionals. Physician 
speech may not simply be labeled conduct in order to evade First Amendment 
scrutiny. The Eleventh Circuit should grant an en banc hearing in Wollschlae-
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by government officials.”); Eleventh Circuit Upholds Florida Law, supra note 93, at 1054 (declaring 
that doctors are only the beginning of the dispute over professional regulation and First Amendment 
rights of professionals). 
 97 See Petition For Rehearing En Banc, supra note 44, at 15 (requesting that the Eleventh Circuit 
hold an en banc hearing and affirm the previous injunction of the Act); Brief of the American Bar 
Association as Amicus Curiae, supra note 44, at 15 (asking the Eleventh Circuit to hold an en banc 
hearing to reverse the Wollschlaeger III decision and conform the panel opinion to the existing prece-
dent). 
